27. Sitzung des FAO/WHO-Codex-Alimentarius-Komitees für Fische und Fischerzeugnisse

1963 wurde von der FAO und WHO die Codex-Alimentarius-Kommission gegründet, die Lebensmittelstandards, Richtlinien und Vorschriften wie Codes of practice im Rahmen des gemeinsamen FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme erarbeiten sollte. Hauptziel dieses Programmes ist der Schutz der Gesundheit der Verbraucher und die Sicherung fairer Praktiken im Lebensmittelhandel sowie die Koordinierung der Arbeiten zu Lebensmittelstandards, die von international, staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Organisationen durchgeführt werden

Exact Mean Computation in Dynamic Time Warping Spaces

Dynamic time warping constitutes a major tool for analyzing time series. In particular, computing a mean series of a given sample of series in dynamic time warping spaces (by minimizing the Fr\'echet function) is a challenging computational problem, so far solved by several heuristic and inexact strategies. We spot some inaccuracies in the literature on exact mean computation in dynamic time warping spaces. Our contributions comprise an exact dynamic program computing a mean (useful for benchmarking and evaluating known heuristics). Based on this dynamic program, we empirically study properties like uniqueness and length of a mean. Moreover, experimental evaluations reveal substantial deficits of state-of-the-art heuristics in terms of their output quality. We also give an exact polynomial-time algorithm for the special case of binary time series

Testing Substitutability of Weak Preferences

In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test substitutability of weak preferences. Interestingly, the algorithm is faster than the algorithm of Hatfield et al. by a linear factor on the domain of strict preferences.Comment: 7 page

An Ordinal Minimax Theorem

In the early 1950s Lloyd Shapley proposed an ordinal and set-valued solution concept for zero-sum games called \emph{weak saddle}. We show that all weak saddles of a given zero-sum game are interchangeable and equivalent. As a consequence, every such game possesses a unique set-based value.Comment: 10 pages, 2 figure

28. Sitzung des FAO/WHO-Codex-Alimentarius-Komitees für Fische und Fischereierzeugnisse

Die 28. Sitzung des Codex-Alimentarius-Komitees für Fische und Fischereierzeugnisse fand in Peking, China, vom 18. bis 22. September 2006 statt. Das Komitee folgte damit der in der letzten Sitzung ausgesprochenen Einladung der chinesischen Regierung und dem Ziel, die Codex-Sitzungen in verschiedenen Teilen der Welt abzuhalten. Geleitet wurde die Sitzung von Dr. Bjørn Røthe Knudsen, Regionaldirektor der norwegischen Behörde für Lebensmittelsicherheit. Professor Li Xiaochuan von der chinesischen Akademie für Fischforschung nahm die Rolle des Co-Chairman ein. Insgesamt 140 Delegierte, die 44 Mitgliedstaaten, die EU und eine internationale Organisation vertraten, nahmen an dieser Sitzung teil. Folgende Punkte wurden auf der diesjährigen Codex-Komitee-Sitzung diskutiert: 1. Erweiterung des Standards für Sardinen und sardinenähn-liche Erzeugnisse 2. Bearbeitung des Entwurfs eines Standards für Störkaviar 3. Überarbeitung des Entwurfs eines Standards für lebende und rohe Muscheln 4. Verhandlung über den Entwurf des Standards für geräu-cherten Fisch 5. Code of Practice für Fische und Fischereierzeugnisse 6. Zukünftige Arbeite

The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes

In using approval voting to elect multiple winners to a committee or council, it is desirable that excess votes—approvals beyond those that a candidate needs to win a seat—not be wasted. The excess method does this by sequentially allocating excess votes to a voter’s as-yet-unelected approved candidates, based on the Jefferson method of apportionment. It is monotonic—approving of a candidate never hurts and may help him or her get elected—computationally easy, and less manipulable than related methods. In parliamentary systems with party lists, the excess method is equivalent to the Jefferson method and thus ensures the approximate proportional representation of political parties. As a method for achieving proportional representation (PR) on a committee or council, we compare it to other PR methods proposed by Hare, Andrae, and Droop for preferential voting systems, and by Phragmén for approval voting. Because voters can vote for multiple candidates or parties, the excess method is likely to abet coalitions that cross ideological and party lines and to foster greater consensus in voting bodies

The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes

In using approval voting to elect multiple winners to a committee or council, it is desirable that excess votes—approvals beyond those that a candidate needs to win a seat—not be wasted. The excess method does this by sequentially allocating excess votes to a voter’s as-yet-unelected approved candidates, based on the Jefferson method of apportionment. It is monotonic—approving of a candidate never hurts and may help him or her get elected—computationally easy, and less manipulable than related methods. In parliamentary systems with party lists, the excess method is equivalent to the Jefferson method and thus ensures the approximate proportional representation of political parties. As a method for achieving proportional representation (PR) on a committee or council, we compare it to other PR methods proposed by Hare, Andrae, and Droop for preferential voting systems, and by Phragmén for approval voting. Because voters can vote for multiple candidates or parties, the excess method is likely to abet coalitions that cross ideological and party lines and to foster greater consensus in voting bodies

Robust and verifiable proportionality axioms for multiwinner voting

When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections, it is surprisingly challenging to capture proportionality formally. As a consequence, the literature has produced numerous competing criteria of when a selected committee qualifies as proportional. Two of the most prominent notions are proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC) [Dummett, 1984] and extended justified representation (EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017]. Both definitions guarantee proportional representation to groups of voters with very similar preferences; such groups are referred to as solid coalitions by Dummett and as cohesive groups by Aziz et al. However, they lose their bite when groups are only almost solid or cohesive